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Abstract 
Prospective memory is the ability to remember and act upon future intentions. In the 
context of daily life, prospective memory intentions can be either self-interested or pro-socially 
motivated (such as remembering to pay a credit card bill or buy a gift for a friend, respectively). 
Research suggests that individuals place greater importance on their performance of prosocial 
intentions rather than self-interested intentions, and a pro-social advantage has been observed in 
prospective memory. I investigated the role of motivation in prospective memory and a person’s 
belief about their cognitive abilities (i.e., metacognition) in regard to prospective memory. The 
present study used an eye-tracking paradigm in which participants were engaged in an ongoing 
visual search task, with a prospective memory task embedded into the trail. Participants’ 
motivational state was manipulated through a monetary incentive, and they also made 
predictions and postdictions about their performance on the prospective memory and ongoing 
tasks as a proxy for metacognition. I found a trend for a prosocial advantage to prospective 
memory performance and metacognitive awareness, and a tendency of neutral motivational states 
in reducing cognitive effort in prospective memory target monitoring. Such trends were not 
observed in the self-interested motivational state.  
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The Effects of Motivational States on Metacognition and Prospective Memory 
Prospective memory, as defined by Einstein & McDaniel (1990), is the ability to 
remember and act upon future intentions. In the context of daily life, prospective memory 
intentions can be either self-interested or altruistically motivated (Brandimonte, Ferrante, 
Bianco, & Villani 2010). An example of a self-interested prospective memory task is 
remembering to order dessert for yourself the next time the waitress stops by your table, while an 
example of an altruistic, or ‘prosocial’ prospective memory task is remembering to complete 
your part of a group project before midnight. Previous research suggests a prosocial advantage in 
remembering to execute previously-formed intentions when compared to self-interested 
incentives or no incentives (Brandimonte & Ferrante, 2015; Brandimonte et al., 2010). In 
addition, Penningroth, Scott, & Freuen (2011) found that individuals consider their performance 
of prosocial prospective memory intentions to be much more important than their performance of 
self-interested prospective memory intentions. In these ways, researchers have used motivational 
states to manipulate the perceived importance of prospective memory tasks, in hopes of altering 
prospective memory performance in laboratory settings. 
Effects of motivation on prospective memory performance can also be seen through 
ongoing task costs – or how much cognitive effort is averted to a simultaneous continuing task. 
These costs are traditionally measured by comparing reaction times to complete an ongoing task 
between a control block (comprising of only the ongoing task) and an experimental block 
(comprising of both an ongoing task and a prospective memory intention). By comparing 
reaction times across motivational states in a prospective memory task, researchers can 
determine if different incentives influence the allocation of cognitive effort on the ongoing task. 
In previous research, reaction time has been quicker in groups with purely prosocial incentives; 
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however, the reaction time of groups with an additional self-interested monetary incentive 
slowed (Brandimonte & Ferrante, 2015; Brandimonte et al., 2010). This suggests that self-
interested intentions require cognitively demanding overt monitoring of the prospective memory 
target, thus causing slow-downs in the ongoing task performance (Smith, 2003). Meanwhile, the 
cognitive processes behind prosocial intentions seem to function more automatically (Bargh et 
al., 1996), possibly as a result of spontaneous retrieval, the sudden retrieval of a previously-
formed intention (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; Scullin et al., 2013).  
In addition to motivation, metacognition – which is the way in which people think about 
their own mental processes – can also alter prospective memory performance. Schnitzspahn, 
Zeintl, Jäger, & Kliegel (2011) observed that prospective memory performance predictions were 
correlated with their actual performance, suggesting that metacognition for prospective memory 
tasks is moderately accurate. Furthermore, the use of performance predictions and metacognition 
has been shown to improve prospective memory task performance (Meier, von Wartburg, Matter, 
Rothen, & Reber 2011). In contrast, Bianchi et al. (2017) studied participant’s prediction of 
prospective memory performance and found participants to be overconfident in their predicted 
performance in a naturalistic setting, regardless of motivational states. These inconsistencies 
reveal how the study of influences of metacognition on prospective memory has the potential to 
be investigated further – particularly the investigation of how motivational states influence 
people’s metacognition in service of prospective remembering. 
Hacker et al. (2018) explored the effects of different motivational states on prospective 
memory task performance along with metacognition and was the first in this line of research to 
use an eye-tracker. In comparison to measures of reaction time, the novel eye-tracking approach 
used by Hacker et al. (2018) enabled a more direct assessment of the ongoing task cost by 
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allowing researchers to observe overt monitoring for the prospective memory target. The study 
used monetary incentive to promote prosocial ($25 to charity), self-interested ($25 to self), or 
neutral (no monetary incentive) motivational states. Participants engaged in an ongoing visual 
search task in which they counted the number of living objects within an array of images. 
Participants were given the prospective memory task of responding to a particular image that 
appeared in a separate region of the screen. Participants first completed a control block of the 
visual search task without a prospective memory demand. Following the control block, 
participants engaged in a video viewing task that consisted of condition-specific videos. For 
example, in the pro-social condition, participants watched a video about the benefits of giving to 
charity. After, participants completed the experimental block of the visual search task, which 
included the prospective memory intention to respond to a particular image that appeared in a 
separate region of the screen. Each block consisted of 44 trials, each lasting 12 seconds. 
Additionally, the prospective memory image, located outside of the main visual array in the 
upper right-hand corner of the screen changed every 4-second, making three subtrials per trial.  
Results from Hacker et al. (2018) found that prospective memory performance was not 
affected by motivational states – however, participants were underconfident in their performance. 
Furthermore, those in the self-interested condition more accurately predicted their performance, 
while those in the prosocial condition more accurately postdicted their performance. These 
results suggest that metacognitive awareness of prospective memory performance can be 
influenced by motivational states in the form of monetary incentives, however, the researchers 
observed ceiling effects. Participant accuracy in the prospective memory task was consistently 
high.  
It is possible that the items in the delay interval (a demographic questionnaire and a 
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context-priming video) did not capture focused or sustained attention, allowing participants to 
internally rehearse the prospective memory instructions, thus improving their accuracy (Martin, 
Brown, & Hicks 2011). It is also possible that both the ongoing and prospective memory tasks 
were too slow and simple, promoting constant monitoring of the prospective memory target 
region. To account for these potential confounds, I used the same eye-tracking paradigm to 
explore this important research question while implementing a task with a higher cognitive load 
during the delay interval (e.g. a verbal fluency test) to prevent intention rehearsal. In addition, I 
increased the speed of the ongoing task to allocate attention away from the prospective memory 
target region. 
There is relatively little literature on the effects of motivation and metacognition on 
successful prospective memory performance. Filling in these gaps may have important 
theoretical implications, such as further advancing prospective memory research in regard to the 
use of an eye-tracker as a proxy for prospective memory target monitoring. My study 
hypothesized that prospective memory performance would be highest in the prosocial condition 
and that changes to the experiment would reduce previously observed ceiling effects. 
Methodology 
Participants and Design 
Participants were undergraduate students from the University of Tennessee at 
Chattanooga (n=37), and they were recruited through the UTC SONA system. The study 
implemented a 2 X 2 X 3 mixed-factor design, with counterbalancing target images (horse/chair) 
as a 2-level between-participants factor, incentive type (control/self-interested/prosocial) as the 
3-leveled between-participants factor, and block (control/prospective memory) as a two-level 
within-participants factor. 
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Materials 
Apparatus: Data were collected using a Sensomotoric Instruments (SMI) Red-250 
mobile eye-tracker with a gaze position accuracy of 0.4˚ and a spatial resolution of 0.03˚. 
Fixation points were defined as lingering for .150s I a 30-pixel diameter and were used to 
measure gaze patterns and target region monitoring. This device obtained data involving eye 
movements and the participants’ monitoring of the prospective memory target region of the 
screen. The EyeWorks eye 14 tracking software allowed for programming and data collection of 
the task. 
 Condition-Specific Script: Between the control and experimental block, participants 
were told of the prospective memory task, target image, and monetary incentive with a 
condition-specific script (see Appendix A). Participants in the prosocial condition were 
incentivized with a chance to win $25 for a charity of their choice, while participants in the self-
interested condition were incentivized with a chance to win a $25 gift card for themselves. Those 
in the standard condition were not given a monetary incentive. 
 Ongoing Task:  Participants were shown an array of images lasting for 9 seconds before 
automatically changing to the next trial. The images were either photographs or graphic images 
of easily identifiable living and nonliving objects. They were obtained from several open-source 















Figure 1. Example of ongoing task/prospective memory target region array. 
 Prospective Memory Task: The prospective memory target region appeared in the upper 
right-hand corner of the screen, which participants needed to monitor for a prospective memory 
target image. As a counterbalancing measure, this image was either a chair or a horse. The image 
in the top right corner changed more rapidly, with 3 sub-trials lasting 3 seconds per trial. 
 Delay Task: Participants completed a delay task that consisted of 3 verbal fluency trials 
lasting one minute each, using the letters F, A, and S. The purpose of this delay task was to create 
temporal distance between the prospective memory task instruction and the completion of the 
prospective memory task. 
 Metacognition Survey: Embedded throughout the experiment were opportunities for 
participants to report their awareness of their own mental processes. Before the delay task, 
participants were given an encoding check to ensure that they understood the task instruction as 
well as the incentive that they were told about in their condition-specific scripts. At this time, 
they were also asked predictive questions (On a scale from 1-100, how well do you think you 
will do in this memory task? On a scale from 1-100, how well do you think you will do in the 
living object count task?) as well as questions signifying how important they thought each of 
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these tasks were. At the end of the experiment, participants were asked postdictive questions (On 
a scale from 1-100, how well do you think you did in this memory task? On a scale from 1-100, 
how well do you think you did in the living object count task?) as well as qualitative questions 
regarding their monitoring strategies (What strategies did you use to remember to click the left 
mouse button when an image of the [chair/horse] appeared?). 
Procedure 
Participation in this study consisted of a single session in the Cognitive Aging, Learning, 
and Memory (CALM) lab, which lasted for approximately 1 hour. The study required the 
participants to sit at a computer, and a mounted eye-tracker recorded gaze data. The participants 
were randomly assigned to one of six groups, differing on the prospective memory target 
(chair/horse) and incentive type (control/self-interested/prosocial). Upon arrival, participants 
signed an informed consent that explained their condition-specific incentives for this experiment 
– for example, the incentive for the prosocial condition was in the form of a $25 donation to a 
charity, the incentive in the self-interested condition was in the form of a $25 gift card, and there 
was no incentive for the control group. Participants then completed a demographic questionnaire. 
With the eye-tracker apparatus, participants began a control block, which consisted of 44 
trials, each with an array of images that changed every 9 seconds. The participants were told to 
count and report the number of living objects in each 9-second trial. The control block included 
the mechanism for the prospective memory task, 3-second-long sub-trials of a separate target 
region in a corner of the screen, but the participants were not made aware of its significance. 
After the control block, participants were given instructions for the prospective memory 
task – to click the left mouse button when an image of a chair or horse appeared in the top right-
hand corner of the screen – and were reminded of their incentives through a condition-specific 
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script. This was followed by an encoding check to ensure their understanding of the task, as well 
as a metacognition questionnaire to allow the participants to predict their accuracy in the 
prospective memory performance. Next, as a delay task, participants completed 3 trials of a 
verbal fluency task, where they had 60 seconds to list words that begin with a specific letter. The 
purpose of this high-cognitive-load task was to distract the participants from the prospective 
memory instructions. 
Once the verbal fluency task was complete, participants began the experimental block. 
They were not reminded of the prospective memory task instructions at this time. The 
experimental block consisted of another 44 trials. Consistent with the control block, each trial 
lasted 9 seconds with 3-second subtrials of the prospective memory target region. Participants 
completed the same ongoing task of counting and reporting the number of living objects, with 
the additional prospective memory task of clicking the right mouse button when the target image 
appeared in the target region of the screen. 
Next, the participants answered more metacognition questions to postdict their 
prospective memory task accuracy. The participants also completed a retrospective memory task, 
to ensure that they retained an understanding of the prospective memory instructions. Finally, 
participants were verbally debriefed and dismissed.  
Results 
 Due to an eye-tracker malfunction, testing had to be stopped before attaining the required 
sample. For this reason, I will focus on descriptive statistics rather than inferential statistics. 
Prospective Memory 
 I operationalized prospective memory performance as the percentage of correct responses 
out of four possible targets. Prospective memory task performance averages were equally high 
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across conditions: standard M = 75.0%, SE = 4.65, 95% CI [56.1, 93.9], prosocial M = 81.3%, 
SE = 5.7, 95% CI [58.2, 104.3], and self-interested M = 76.6%, SE = 4.0, 95% CI [56.1, 93.9] 
(see Figure 2). 
Metacognition 
I operationalized prospective memory performance prediction using a self-reported 
response on a scale from 1-100. Prospective memory task performance prediction averages were 
equally high across conditions: standard M = 72.0%, SE = 5.4, 95% CI [61.0, 83.0], prosocial M 
= 76.8%, SE = 6.6, 95% CI [63.2, 90.2], and self-interested M = 70.9%, SE = 4.7, 95%, CI [61.3, 
80.5] (see Figure 2). I operationalized prospective memory performance postdiction using a self-
reported response on a scale from 1-100. Prospective memory task performance postdiction 
averages differ across conditions: standard M = 68.30%, SE = 4.6, 95% CI [58.9, 77.8], prosocial 
M = 79.1%, SE = 5.7, 95% CI [67.6, 10.7], and self-interested M = 84.2%, SE = 4.0, 95% CI 








Figure 2. Metacognitive awareness and prospective memory performance side-by-side. 
Monitoring 
I operationalized monitoring as total gaze fixations in the prospective memory target 
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region across all trials within each task block, which represented how often participants 
monitored for the prospective memory target. Monitoring was observed in the experimental 
block where there were significantly higher fixations; standard M = 54.25, SE = 12.65, 95% CI 
[28.51, 80.00], prosocial M = 100.50, SE = 15.50, 95% CI [68.97, 103.03], and self-interested M 
= 87.25, SE = 10.96, 95%, CI [64.96, 109.54]. Comparatively, the control block experienced 
very few fixations; standard M = 11.8, SE = 4.60, 95% CI [2.48, 21.19], prosocial M = 4.12, SE 
= 5.63, 95% CI [-7.33, 15.58], and self-interested M = 3.98, SE = .017, 95% CI [-2.35, 13.85] 








Figure 3. Prospective memory target monitoring by condition between the task blocks. 
Ongoing Task 
I operationalized ongoing task accuracy as the degree to which a participant’s response 
was correct, calculated by how many digits a response differed from the correct number of living 
objects across 44 trials in each block, inverted and shown as a percent. In the control block, 
standard M = 88.1%, SE = .02, 95% CI [83.7, 92.4], prosocial M = 94.7%, SE = .026, 95% CI 
[89.3, 100.1], and self-interested M = 89.4%, SE = .017, 95% CI [85.6, 93.2]. In the 
experimental block, standard M = 86.9%, SE = .029, 95% CI [80.9, 92.8], prosocial M = 92.1%, 
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SE = .036, 95% CI [84.8, 99.4], and self-interested M = 88.1%, SE = .025, 95%, CI [82.9, 93.2] 








Figure 4. Ongoing task performance by condition. 
Comparison of Hacker at al. (2018) and present study 
 I measured the effects of the altered methodology on the ceiling effects observed in 
Hacker et al. (2018) by comparing the means of prospective memory performance across 
conditions in both studies. The performance in Hacker et al. was higher in every condition: 
standard M = 89.4%, SE = 5.6, 95% CI [78.5, 100.30], prosocial M = 89.0%, SE = 5.5, 95% CI 
[77.9, 100.10], and self-interested M = 83.0%, SE = 5.6, 95% CI [71.9, 94.1]. In every condition, 
I observed lower prospective memory performance accuracy: standard M = 75.0%, SE = 4.65, 
95% CI [56.1, 93.9], prosocial M = 81.3%, SE = 5.7, 95% CI [58.2, 104.3], and self-interested M 
= 76.6%, SE = 4.0, 95% CI [56.1, 93.9].  
 I calculated inferential statistics using a univariate general linear model, with the within-
participants factor being performance and the between-participants factors being the condition 
and the experiment. There was no main effect of experiment, F(1,110) =  1.782, p = 0.185 (see 
Figure 5). 










Figure 5. Prospective memory performance accuracy by condition between experiments. 
Discussion 
Consistent with previous studies (Brandimonte & Ferrante, 2015; Brandimonte et al., 
2010; Penningroth, Scott, & Freuen 2011), participants who were given a prosocial incentive had 
higher prospective memory performance. This trend supports the suggestion made by Bargh, 
Chen, & Burrows (1996) that prosocial intentions function more automatically in prospective 
memory tasks. These results offer more evidence in favor of the process of spontaneous retrieval 
in prospective memory. 
While prospective memory performance was relatively high in all three conditions, I was 
successful in reducing the high prospective memory performance found in Hacker et al. (2018). 
When compared to Hacker et al. 2018, the present study saw a decrease in prospective memory 
performance, suggesting that the decrease in trial time and the use of a verbal fluency test as a 
delay task successfully reduced ceiling effects. It is suggested that the decrease in trial time 
increased the difficulty of the task and the delay task required a higher cognitive load to 
complete. 
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Regardless of condition, participants were relatively accurate in predicting and 
postdicting their performance in the prospective memory task, although there was a slight trend 
for higher metacognitive accuracy in the prosocial condition than the self-interested or standard 
conditions. More research must be done to investigate the nature of this relationship, as well as to 
examine the mechanisms that underly it. 
The present study observed high monitoring of the prospective memory target region in 
the incentivized conditions (prosocial and self-interested), with lower monitoring observed in the 
standard unincentivized condition. This trend suggests that a neutral motivational state leads to a 
lower allocation of attention in the prospective memory target region, which has been attributed 
to lower motivation to complete the prospective memory task successfully, due to a lack of 
incentive. This outcome appears to be inconsistent with the theory of spontaneous retrieval, as it 
suggests that prosocial motivation does rely on monitoring rather than a more automatic retrieval 
process. I propose that prosocial motivation could use a more automatic retrieval process, such as 
spontaneous retrieval, in using covert monitoring rather than overt monitoring. This requires 
future investigation. Furthermore, these results could also be a result of the study’s small sample 
size, and the methods should be replicated in future studies with a larger sample. 
Future studies could attempt to reduce the limitations of my research, such as low 
participant numbers. In addition, future studies could use this paradigm to further examine this 
apparent advantage of prosocial motivation on prospective memory performance without 
experiencing ceiling effects found in previous research. They could also use this eye-tracking 
paradigm to research other factors, such as emotional states, in relation to prospective memory. 
In summary, my study extends previous research involving the effects of motivational 
states on prospective memory and metacognition, as well as the use of an eye-tracking paradigm 
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as a more direct assessment of prospective memory task monitoring. Consistent with previous 
research, the present study suggests a prosocial advantage in prospective memory that has been 
attributed to a more automatic system of remembering, such as spontaneous retrieval. The 
present study also informs prospective memory literature by demonstrating the use of a verbal 
fluency test as an effective delay task between prospective memory task instruction and 
completion. The information in the present study and subsequent lines of research might assist 
individuals, both in the general population and those with cognitive impairments (e.g. 
Alzheimer’s disease) in developing more efficient prospective memory strategies in their daily 
lives.  
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Standard script: “In the next phase of the experiment, in addition to counting the number of 
living objects, we are particularly interested in how well you remember to respond to particular 
items you will encounter in this task. A new image will appear every four seconds in the top right 
corner of the screen during each trial. Whenever you see a [chair/horse] appear in the top right 
corner, you should click the left mouse button. The [chair/horse] will rarely appear but it will 
appear more than once over the course of the experiment. Remember, you do not need to include 
images in the top right corner in your living object count; however, you should click the left 
mouse button whenever you see a [chair/horse] in the top right corner.” 
Pro-social script: “In the next phase of the experiment, in addition to counting the number of 
living objects, we are particularly interested in how well you remember to respond to particular 
items you will encounter in this task. A new image will appear every four seconds in the top right 
corner of the screen during each trial. Whenever you see a [chair/horse] appear in the top right 
corner, you should click the left mouse button. The [chair/horse] will rarely appear but it will 
appear more than once over the course of the experiment. Remember, you do not need to include 
images in the top right corner in your living object count; however, you should click the left 
mouse button whenever you see a [chair/horse] in the top right corner. 
 “You will be competing with other participants to win a $25 donation to a non-profit 
charity. Each time that you remember to click the left mouse button when an image of a 
[chair/horse] appears in the top right corner of the screen, you will earn a lottery ticket. At the 
end of the study, we will draw lottery tickets and 25% of participants will earn a $25 donation to 
a non-profit charity. For example, if 100 people complete the study, we will draw lottery tickets 
for 25 winners. Thus, the more times you remember to perform this memory task, the more 
lottery tickets you will earn and the better your chance will be of winning this incentive.” 
Self-interested script: “In the next phase of the experiment, in addition to counting the number 
of living objects, we are particularly interested in how well you remember to respond to 
particular items you will encounter in this task. A new image will appear every four seconds in 
the top right corner of the screen during each trial. Whenever you see a [chair/horse] appear in 
the top right corner, you should click the left mouse button. The [chair/horse] will rarely appear 
but it will appear more than once over the course of the experiment. Remember, you do not need 
to include images in the top right corner in your living object count; however, you should click 
the left mouse button whenever you see a [chair/horse] in the top right corner.  
 “You will be competing with other participants to win a $25 Amazon gift card. Each time 
that you remember to click the left mouse button when an image of a [chair/horse] appears in the 
top right corner of the screen, you will earn a lottery ticket. At the end of the study, we will draw 
lottery tickets and 25% of participants will earn a $25 Amazon gift card. For example, if 100 
people complete the study, we will draw lottery tickets for 25 winners. Thus, the more times you 
remember to perform this memory task, the more lottery tickets you will earn and the better your 
chance will be of winning this incentive.” 
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